Light Tank is a must

Light Tank is a must

Wed, 07/22/2020 - 15:52
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By Lt Gen A B Shivane (Retd)

 

 

“It is not the Big Armies that

Win Battles…

… It is the Good Ones”

 

                                                 -Field Marshal Maurice Comte de Saxe (1782)

 

In 2018, Indian Army had dawned onthe much-hyped exercise to address the force levels, organisation structures, capabilities and related shortfalls to optimally transform intoa lean, agile, versatile and technology enabled combined arms modular force, capable of meeting future operational challenges. Having handled a similar study during service tenure, author had concluded that “Right-Sizing without Capability Outcomes’ would be haphazard and bereft of desired organisational and combat capability outcomes”.

 

Ironically, not only capability voids were not addressed but with the pushing of the Mountain Strike Corps under the carpet and the dwindling defence budget, the stage was set for exposing our vulnerabilities on the Northern front that did not get the attention it deserved.

 

Just two years later, today we face a situation on the Himalayan borders, where our territorial integrity is under threat.

The Wuhan and Mahabalipuram bonhomie melted into multiple intrusions by Chinaman in Ladakh threatening a potential conflict situation. Did the deterrence fail on our northern borders? Did we again walk into the Chinese trap? Did the absence of rapid deployment modular forces, on the lines of planned Integrated Battle Groups, both with offensive and defensive capabilities create vulnerabilities and curtail our Quid Pro Quo options?

 

These are some of the questions which need no answers.

Imagine a scenario where a combined arms force comprising light tanks, BMP-2, well-equipped Infantry and special forces, integral army attack helicopters, light self-propelled gun with logistic resilience, duly supported by “eyes in the sky” and multi-role combat aircraft existed as forward deployment at all these locations including demonstrated amphibious capability at Pangong Tso. It leaves little doubt that the course of events of May 2020, would have been different had this desired capability been a reality.

 

While the misadventures of Chinaman will get a befitting response by the indomitable spirit and professionalism of the Indian Soldier, the pendulum could have swayed to pre-empt and keep the Chinaman at bay.

 

The Light Tank Quagmire

 

Ironically, one such critical capabilities - the “LightTank”has been endlessly debated by the Indian Army, albeit more often than not with fixations to medium tank hangovers and technological perceptions of yesteryears light tank. The threat of the Chinese light tank in Tibet in 2015 should have given a wakeup call to the decision-makers. There have been repeated several attempts to procure light tank over three decades since 1983. These include the trials of three light tanks as replacement of PT-76, 1999 Request For Information (RFI) for 200 wheeled and 100 track light tanks, the ad hoc Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) stand-alone effort of putting a 105mm gun on a BMP-2 chassis which miserably failed and not long ago in 2017 the “In-Principle Approval” for pursuing the case for a mountain tank. Unfortunately, none were professionally pursued to their logical end.

 

Paradoxically, the world over the light mobile protected platforms have emerged as a frontline military capability to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict, yet our inventory consists of only medium tanks and seen pushing for more heavy tanks (Arjun Mk 1A/2). Indian military history is replete with lessons of the efficacy of Light Tanks in the mountains starting with Stuarts in Battle of Zojila 1948 which saved Ladakh being lost to Pakistan and the impact of six airlifted AMX13 light tank at Chushul in 1962 and Nathu La 1962 which stalled the Chinese advance. The operational challenges of terrain and weather thus remaining the same and the threat matrix enhancing, the need for the lighter agile platform should not have been overlooked. Gone are the days of bigger the better or heavier the mightier. We thus need the capability boost of a light tank as of the day before yesterday.

 

Employment Perspective

 

India’s security paradigm entails multi-spectrum, multi-front and diverse terrain challenges at short notice. In particular, the threat trajectory has taken ascendancy on our Northern Borders and future limited wars, being fought in the mountains and marginal terrains.Effective Deterrence and agile diplomacy will thus need to be empowered through combat-ready and credible rapid deployable forces.The equipment profile of Mechanised Forces must accordingly have the right mix of medium and light tanks to generate greater operational options and versatility in future wars.

 

The reintroduction of light tanks would permit it to be air deployed, move on tracks or wheels across mountain passes / low classification bridges, pass through narrower lanes in built-up areas, and wade through marshier/riverine terrain like in Punjab or Rann of Kutch, otherwise impeded by the present medium tanks in inventory.

 

The broad employment concept of the light tank thus devolves around its superior mobility (strategic, operational and tactical), versatility, enhanced manoeuvrability (small turning radius, high power to weight ratio and low nominal ground pressure), and lethal firepower, especially high angle fire cum missile firing ability. While mobility advantage of light tank certainly provides strategic flexibility, however, its superior agility, ‘power to weight ratio’, and ‘dimensions’, which gives it a major advantage with reference to inter and intra valley movement in high altitude terrains.

 

Along the Northern Borders, it would augment the defence potential by forward deployment and denial of corridors to the enemy. The primary role would essentially be to close in and destroy enemy forces and facilitate the freedom of action by infantry in mountainous or marginal terrain. Its availability would add teeth in limited offensive or quid pro quo operations into enemy territory. The light tanks would not only target the will of the enemy but also enhance capability through pre-emption, dislocation and disruption of enemy forces. Thus, light tanks would add to the credible deterrence posture and warfighting capability on the Northern Front.

 

Along the Western Borders, proliferation of built-up areas (BUA) and canals/swamps have restricted mobility corridors for medium tanks. The Rann of Kutch with its low soil bearing capacity also impedes the movement of heavier vehicles. A mix of medium and light tanks with the amphibious capability and superior tactical agility would thus facilitate the tempo of operations as also serve as potent reconnaissance force in the Western Front. Its innovative application could help in seizing control of time, space and force matrix in war. The light tank would also find its enhanced utility in hybrid wars of the future.

With its air portability and amphibious characteristics, its role as part of Rapid Deployment Force for out of area contingencies, as part of an emergency response force, backup armour-deficient airborne troops, amphibious operations for establishing a beachhead and protection of our island territories, would add to our capability matrix. Its utility as part of UN Forces could also find favour and add to the nation’s international stature.

 

Global Scan: Light Tanks

 

There are a large number of light tanks, both tracked and wheeled, in the inventory of foreign armies.  Some IFVs and ICVs like BMD and BMP 3 have not been included as they don’t meet the operational connotation of a light tank. Amongst the more advance is the Russian SPRUT- SDM1, the Chinese ZTQ 105/Type 15 and the USA Project MPF Light Tank. A comparative table of global light tanks both track and wheeled is as placed below.

 

Tracked Light Tanks

 

 

Wt

Power/ Wt Ratio

Primary Armt

Msl

Crew

Fording

Amph

Air Tpt

Armr Protection

M 8 AGS

(USA)

19.25 ton/ 22.25 ton/ 24.75 ton

29.1 hp/ton

32.1 hp/ton

105mm Rif gun

NK

3

1.2 m

-

NK

NK

Stingray

(USA)

22.6 ton

24.75 hp/ton

105mm Rif Gun

NK

4

1.07 m

-

NK

23 MM

CV 90 120-T

(SWEDEN)

23-35 ton

27.3 hp/ton

120mm SB Gun

No

4

1.5mm

-

Airbus A400M

Welded steel hull with add-on armr, APS

Sprut

SD M1  (Russia)

18  -20 ton

28.3 hp/ton

125 mm SB Gun

Laser Guided

Eff rg 5km

3

NK

Yes

Air Lifted

SCALABLE

Type 63A

(China)

22 ton

26.3 hp/ton

105mm Rif Gun

9M117 copy

Eff rg 5 km

4

14 km/hr

-

NK

Welded rolled steel hull

IKV91

(Sweden)

23-35 ton

24.1

hp/ton

40 mm Bofors Auto cannon

-

3

NK

Yes

NK

MEXAS

 (Ceramic applique armr)

ZTQ 105 / TYPE 15 (China)

30-35 ton

17 - 20 hp/Ton

105 mm with A-tk Msl (High Angle)

-

3

NK

Yes

Yes

NK

 

Wheeled Light Tanks

 

M1128 Mob Gun Sys (USA)

Centauro

(Italy)

Pandur II

(Austria)

Jaguar EBRC

(France)

Ptl 02

(China)

Wt

18.7 ton

24 ton

20 ton

25 ton

19 ton

Eng (HP)

350 hp

Diesel

520 hp

Turbo Charged

Diesel

285hp/ 400 hp

Turbo Charged Diesel   

NK

320 hp

Turbo charged

Diesel

Power/ Wt Ratio

23 hp/ton

19.35 hp/ton

14.25 hp/ton

20.5 hp/ton

NK

17 hp/ton

Primary Armt

105 mm Rif Gun

105mm Rif/ 120mm SB Gun

105mm Rif Gun

40mm Cannon

100 mm SB Gun


Secy Armt

7.62mm Coax MG

12.7mm AAMG

2x7.62 mm MG (Coax & AAMG)

1x7.62mm MG

7.62mm MG

7.62mm Coax MG

12.7mm AAMG

Msl Armt (rg)

-

-

Can fire

Details NK

ATGM

Eff rg 4km

-

Op Rg

530 km

800 km

700 km

800 km

600 km

Max Speed

100 km/hr

100 km/hr

100 km/hr

NK

85 km/hr

Crew

NK

4

3/ 4

3

4+1

Fording

NK

Depth-1.5 m

1.5 m

NK

 

Amph

No

-

-

No

With fln kit

Air Tpt

C-130

NK

C-130

NK

Y-8; Y-20

Armr/ Protection Sys

14.5mm resistant

Slant armr for RPGs

Welded Hull 20mm/40mm resistant

7.62mm resistant

14.5mm resistant (Frontal)

14.5mm resistant

APS(Soft kill)

Welded steel armr 12.7mm resistant

 

Way Forward

 

Given the emergence of Chinese Light Tank threat a reality on our Northern Borders, need for a threat cum capability planning and addressing present tank fleet management criticalities, the need for a light tank is well established. It’s time that the inertia is set aside and tangible actions are taken for a definitive time-critical outcome.The present dilemmais of time-critical emergency procurement in the face of Chinese threat knocking on our doors.

 

The option thus narrows down to a Government to Government procurement aiming at bridging capability void as soon as possible, based on the defined operational requirement, existing platform matching and at a reasonable cost. This may not be the best option but for the time criticality of threat manifestation. The capability for making a light tank does exist with the Indian Defence Industry. However, would entail a development time penalty with no assurances of success, which may lead to delayed capability manifestation.

 

Some progress has already been made through local initiatives like by Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) who has developed a virgin indigenous chassis for the light tank and thus holds a promise for an indigenous solution. This effort could be fast-tracked and result in a tailor-made solution to user specifications. However, the Chinese will not wait for Indian capability building to arrive before stepping forward again. Thus, a balanced value, vulnerability and risk analysis must dictate the way forward. The endless debate on the light tank must end and a professional approach must ensure its manifestation in a time-critical manner. 

 

*Author is former DG, Mech Forces, Indian Army. Views expressed here are personal.